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Recent Decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit: Criminal Procedure
The Office of the Independent Counsel and Grand Jury Secrecy
A. Introduction
In In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091,1 the D.C. Circuit ruled on a motion for
summary reversal of an order entered by the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia ("District Court"), where such order required the Office of
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr ("OIC") to provide evidence as to why
the OIC should not be held in contempt for violating the grand jury secrecy
rule, Rule 6(e).2 The alleged violation of grand jury secrecy concerned a New
York Times article that contained information about the grand jury investiga-
tion of President William J. Clinton, and which named the OIC as the source
of the information.
3
In order to rule on the motion, the D.C. Circuit first had to determine
whether it had authority to hear the motion filed by the OIC, which was
before the court on an interlocutory appeal.4 Upon a determination of
proper jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the collateral order doctrine,5
the D.C. Circuit concluded it was unnecessary to rule on the validity of the
OIC's federal sovereign immunity claim, and turned to the merits of the
case.
6
The merits related to whether the information contained in the New
York Times article amounted to disclosures constituting a prima facie viola-
tion of Rule 6(e).7 In answering this question, the D.C. Circuit clarified the
scope of Rule 6(e) and provided insight into the elements of a disclosure that
would constitute a prima facie violation of the Rule.8 The D.C. Circuit then
looked to the information in the New York Times article, and held that the
disclosure did not constitute a prima facie violation of Rule 6(e).9 The court,
1 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
2 Id. at 996-97. The grand jury secrecy rule, codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 6(e)(2), states in part that "an attorney for the government ... shall not disclose matters
occurring before the grand jury." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
3 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d at 997. For a more in-depth description of the
content of the New York Times article, see infra section B.
4 Id. at 999.
5 See infra section D.1.
6 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d at 1001.
7 Id. at 999. See infra section C.4 for the elements of a prima facie violation of Rule 6(e).
8 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d at 1001-04.
9 Id. at 1003-04.
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therefore, granted the OIC's motion for summary reversal and remanded the
case with instructions to the District Court to dismiss the Rule 6(e) contempt
proceeding pending against the OIC.10
B. Facts and Procedural History
On January 31, 1999, a front-page article published in the New York
Times spoke to an unheard of possibility: a grand jury indictment of a sitting
president." The article reported that OIC attorneys believed Kenneth Starr
would seek a grand jury indictment against President Clinton for the charges
of perjury and obstruction of justice arising from both the President's sworn
testimony in a deposition for the Paula Jones case, and for his testimony
before a federal grand jury taken pursuant to the OIC's investigation.12 On
the following day, both the Office of the President and President Clinton
himself, filed a motion in the District Court for an order directing the OIC to
show cause why the OIC should not be held in contempt for violating Rule
6(e).13 The Office of the President and President Clinton argued that the
OIC's violation was evident from the information contained in the New York
Times article, which included disclosures by government attorneys of matters
before the grand jury.14 The OIC responded to this motion by asserting that
the information in the article did not fall within the Rule 6(e) definition of
"matters occurring before the grand jury," and, alternatively, the OIC was
not the source of the disclosures. 15 Although the OIC later withdrew the
source defense, and conceded that the source of the article's information was
a member of the office, the Office continued to assert the information was
not within the scope of Rule 6(e).1
6
The District Court determined that the disclosures within the article
were a prima facie violation of Rule 6(e), granted the motion filed by the
Office of the President and President Clinton, and ordered both Mr. Bakaly
and the OIC to "show cause why they should not be held in civil contempt
for a violation of Rule 6(e)."'1 7 The District Court concluded that this show
cause proceeding was to be "closed and ex parte,"' 8 but agreed to stay the
proceedings until the Department of Justice ("DOJ") completed its related
criminal investigation of the leak. 19 Once the DOJ investigation was com-
plete, the District Court proceeded sua sponte with the contempt proceed-
10 Id. at 1005.
11 Id. at 997 (citing Don Van Natta, Jr., Starr Is Weighing Whether To Indict Sitting Presi-





16 Id. After learning that the source of this leak was Charles G. Bakaly, III, a counselor
and spokesperson for the Independent Counsel, the OIC took "administrative action" against
Mr. Bakaly and forwarded the information to the Department of Justice for purposes of a crimi-
nal investigation. Id
17 Id. at 997-98.
18 Id. at 998 (emphasis omitted) (citing In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1075-
76 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
19 Id.
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ings, ordering the DOJ to serve as prosecutor against both Mr. Bakaly and
the OIC even though the focus of the DOJ investigation was solely on con-
tempt charges against Mr. Bakaly.20 The DOJ objected to the court's action
against the OIC, arguing the following: (1) no facts existed to justify further
criminal proceedings against the OIC; (2) the court had no authority to pur-
sue charges against the OIC because Rule 6(e) applies only to individuals; (3)
the OIC could not be held vicariously liable for the actions of its staff mem-
bers; and (4) the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity protected the OIC
against a criminal contempt proceeding.21 The OIC agreed with the argu-
ments of the DOJ-namely that there was no factual basis for continued
action and that the OIC was protected from suit under federal sovereign im-
munity-and filed an emergency motion with the District Court to vacate the
court's orders to continue the contempt proceeding.22
Failing to receive a court ruling on the emergency motion, and nearing
the date of the required status conference appearance, the OIC filed a mo-
tion with the D.C. Circuit requesting summary reversal of the lower court's
orders relating to the finding of a prima facie violation of Rule 6(e) and the
continuation of the criminal contempt proceeding.23 In order to provide an
appropriate amount of time to consider this appeal, the D.C. Circuit issued
an administrative stay of the District Court's criminal contempt proceedings,
and ordered all involved parties "to brief the question whether the alleged
disclosures in the New York Times article relied upon by the district court in
ordering a criminal contempt proceeding constitute a prima facie violation of
Rule 6(e)." 24
C. Significant Legal Background
1. Collateral Order Doctrine
The final judgment rule25 provides that a federal appellate court does
not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a district court decision unless
that decision "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment. '26 If a district court's decision does
not fall within the requirements of the final judgment rule, the decision must
meet an exception to this general rule before an appellate court can assert
jurisdiction over an appeal of a case at an intermediate stage of the judicial
process.27
20 Id. (noting the District Court explained its inclusion of Bakaly and the OIC in these
contempt proceedings by asserting that the charges against both Mr. Bakaly and the OIC were
"closely related" matters that would be "best resolved through a single contempt proceeding").
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. The OIC also requested, as an alternative to a summary reversal, a stay of the
contempt proceedings pending appeal. Id. Furthermore, the 0IC also filed a writ of mandamus
in case it was determined that the D.C. Circuit did not have jurisdiction to hear the OIC's inter-
locutory appeal. Id. at 998 n.3.
24 Id. at 998-99.
25 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) (providing the statutory authority for this principle of
finality).
26 Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
27 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978).
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Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.28 set out one such exception
to the final judgment rule: the collateral order doctrine.29 According to the
Cohen Court, the rationale underlying the exception is that the rights at issue
in collateral orders are "too important to be denied review and too indepen-
dent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated. °30 In Coopers & Lybran v. Livesay, the
Court elaborated on the Cohen analysis and stated that in order for a court
order to fall under this exception, "the order must conclusively determine the
disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.
' '31
2. Federal Sovereign Immunity
In United States v. Sherwood,32 the Supreme Court discussed the signifi-
cance of federal sovereign immunity, stating that "[t]he United States, as sov-
ereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued,... and the terms
of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to enter-
tain the suit.''33 Without such consent, a claim of sovereign immunity serves
as protection from defending the suit itself rather than merely as a defense
from liability due to an adverse judgment.34 This protection extends to the
federal government as well as to all federal agencies falling within its author-
ity.35 However, sovereign immunity is not absolute because it may be
waived.
36
Since sovereign immunity can be waived, it has been described as "dif-
fer[ing] from the classic 'jurisdictional' limitation of Article lI, ' ' 3 7 and de-
fined as "hybrid" in nature.38 This characterization becomes significant to a
court's authority to reach the merits of a case before it on appeal. Although
a purely jurisdictional question must first be resolved before the court can
proceed to consider the merits, 39 a "less than pure jurisdictional question"
does not have to be addressed before a court proceeds to consider the merits
of that case.
40
28 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
29 Id. at 546.
30 Id
31 Coopers & Lybrand, 427 U.S. at 468 (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546).
32 United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
33 Id. at 586.
34 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
35 Id. This protection is arguably derived from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1000 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Bartlett ex rel
Newman v. Brown, 824 F.2d 1240, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (noting that although the court as-
sumed that the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity is a constitutional one not all agree with
such an assumption).
36 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475).
37 Id. (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475).
38 kd (quoting United States ex ret Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., 173 F.3d 890, 892-93
(D.C. Cir. 1999)).
39 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.23d at 1000 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)).
40 Id. (quoting Long, 173 F.3d at 894); see also Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Employees' Ret.
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Statutes may expressly waive the federal government's claim of sover-
eign immunity in certain circumstances. 41 Two U.S. Courts of Appeal have
held that the Administrative Procedure Act42 ("APA") effects such a statu-
tory waiver of the right not to be sued.43 However, some appellate courts
have not focused on this APA language and continue to hold that the federal
government does indeed possess the right to claim sovereign immunity from
defending a civil suit unless there is explicit statutory language to the con-
trary.44 Courts are undecided as to whether a similar statutory waiver exists
with respect to criminal provisions.45
3. Rule 6(e)-Grand Jury Secrecy
A grand jury is an important part of the federal criminal justice system,
and it is a "body that conducts its business in private. '46 In Douglas Oil
Company of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest,47 the Supreme Court em-
phasized that grand jury proceedings must be kept secret if the grand jury
system is to function correctly.48 The Court summarized the various interests
served by the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, including the protection of
potential witnesses,49 the protection of witnesses who have already testified,50
the protection of the accused,5' and the interests of justice.52
Rule 6(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure codifies this
grand jury requirement and provides:
Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 54-57 (1st Cir. 1999). But see United States ex. rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ.,
171 F.3d 279, 286-88 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that all jurisdictional questions must be answered
before addressing the merits because deciding the merits first would effectively be giving advi-
sory opinions); Seaborn v. Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1144 (1999) (holding that a state's assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit must be addressed prior to reaching the merits).
41 E.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) ("A waiver of the Federal Government's
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text.").
42 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
43 Pullman Constr. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
Congress waived the federal government's right not to be sued when it was a party to a civil suit
via the statutory language of the APA); Alaska v. United States, 64 F.3d 1352, 1355-57 (9th Cir.
1995) (agreeing with the Pullman court that federal sovereign immunity is no longer a right to
not be named a party in a civil suit but rather merely a defense from liability).
44 E.g., McQueen v. Bullock, 907 F.2d 1544, 1550-51 (5th Cir. 1990); Coleman v. Espy, 986
F.2d 1184, 1189 (8th Cir. 1993).
45 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d at 999.
46 In re Motion of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
47 Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
48 Id. at 218.
49 Id. at 219. The rationale behind the protection of potential witnesses is that public
knowledge of the preindictment proceedings may deter them from "com[ing] forward volunta-
rily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony." Id&
50 Id. Keeping secret the testimony of actual witnesses that have come before the grand
jury serves to encourage complete and truthful testimony because there is a decreased chance
that the witness will "be open to retribution as well as to inducements." Id.
51 Id. ("[B]y preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are
accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.") (citing United
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958)).
52 Id. The secrecy of the proceedings reduces the chance that "those about to be indicted
would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment." Id.
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A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a re-
cording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, [or] an
attorney for the government,... shall not disclose matters occurring
before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in
accordance with this rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be
punished as a contempt of court.5
3
Rule 6(e) "serves to protect the identities of witnesses or jurors, the sub-
stance of testimony, the strategy or direction of the investigation, the deliber-
ations or questions of jurors, and the like."54 It is not, however, without its
limitations because "[i]t does not require... that a veil of secrecy be drawn
over all matters occurring in the world that happen to be investigated by a
grand jury.' 55 Although the rule does apply to both grand jurors and govern-
ment attorneys, it does not apply to grand jury witnesses who choose to dis-
close the content of their testimony.
5 6
Enforcement proceedings serve as the tool for ensuring adherence to the
requirements of Rule 6(e). Barry v. United States57 provides the general out-
line for such enforcement actions brought in the D.C. Circuit.58 A prima
facie violation of Rule 6(e) for disclosures in a news report must include in-
formation consisting of "matters occurring before the grand jury," and the
source of the disclosed information must be a government attorney or
agent.59 Most of the evidence presented to satisfy both elements of a prima
facie violation arises from the content of the news report itself.60
Once a district court finds that a prima facie violation of Rule 6(e) exists,
it proceeds with a show cause hearing, where the burden then shifts to the
government to provide evidence rebutting the presumption of a Rule 6(e)
violation.61 This hearing is to be conducted ex parte,62 and under in camera
review63 rather than in a "fully adversarial manner."64 If the government is
53 FED. R. Cium. P. 6(e)(2).
54 SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing Douglas Oil
Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979)).
55 1d; see also FED. R. CriM. P. 6(e)(3) (providing exceptions to the general rule of secrecy
in particular circumstances)
56 In re Investigation Before Apr. 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 606 n.11 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
57 Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
58 Id. at 1321; accord In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(reiterating the use of the Barry court's decision in determining the proper way in which to
proceed with such an enforcement action).
59 Barry, 865 F.2d at 1321 (quotation omitted) (citing United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d
959, 963 (11th Cir. 1983); Lance v. United States, 610 F.2d 202, 216-20 (5th Cir. 1980)).
60 Id. at 1325.
61 Id. at 1321. This shift in burden is premised on the idea that the government is in a
better position to determine whether the information disclosed was a matter before the grand
jury and whether it was the source of the disclosure. Id at 1326.
62 An exparte proceeding is one "in which not all parties are present or given the opportu-
nity to be heard." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1221 (17th ed. 1999).
63 An in camera review is one either completed in the judge's chambers, or at least done so
privately. Id
64 In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (providing addi-
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able to conclusively rebut the presumption, then the enforcement action is
dismissed.65 If the government fails to meet its burden during the show cause
hearing, it is found in contempt for violating Rule 6(e),6 6 and the court pro-
ceeds to consider the appropriate remedy for the violation.67 The remedy
may consist of "civil contempt sanctions or equitable relief or both, 'depend-
ing upon the nature of the violation and what the trial court deems necessary
to prevent further unlawful disclosures of matters before the grand jury."' 6
D. The Court's Decision
The D.C. Circuit first determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the in-
terlocutory appeal of the OIC,6 9 and then concluded that the disclosures in
the New York Times article did not constitute a prima facie violation of Rule
6(e).70 The D.C. Circuit, therefore, granted the OIC's motion for summary
reversal and remanded the case to the District Court with an instruction to
dismiss the pending contempt proceeding.71
1. The Court's Jurisdiction
The D.C. Circuit began with an explanation of its jurisdiction to hear this
interlocutory appeal.72 The court found it possessed jurisdiction under the
collateral order doctrine because the lower court to have "conclusively re-
jected" the OIC's claim of sovereign immunity.73 The court addressed the
elements of the collateral order doctrine and determined all three were
met.74 The D.C. Circuit first found that the District Court's order was a con-
clusive determination of the OIC's claim of sovereign immunity because the
order required the OIC to appear as a defendant.75 In particular, since fed-
eral sovereign immunity protects the government from suit itself,76 which in-
cludes protection from appearing before the court as a defendant in a status
conference, the District Court's demand for an appearance served as a con-
clusive rejection of the OIC's claim of immunity from suit.
77
tional instruction on the way in which to proceed with a show cause hearing in light of the lack of
detail to this matter provided by the Barry Court). An ex parte proceeding with an in camera
review serves to maintain the secret nature and investigative function of the grand jury far better
than a full scale adversarial proceeding. Id.
65 Id. at 1076.
66 Id. at 1068.
67 Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[The trial court] may
order the Government to take steps to stop any publicity emanating from its employees.").
68 In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Barry, 865 F.2d at 1323).
69 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
70 Id. at 1003-04.
71 Id. at 1005.
72 Id. at 999-1001.
73 Id. at 999.
74 The D.C. Circuit relied upon the decision of Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.
463, 468 (1978), when outlining the elements of a collateral order. For a discussion of these
elements see supra section C.1.
75 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d at 999.
76 Supra section C.2.
77 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d at 999.
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The D.C. Circuit then addressed the second element of the collateral
order doctrine, and concluded without further explanation that the District
Court's rejection of the OIC's sovereign immunity claim constituted "an im-
portant issue separate from the merits of the contempt charge. '78 Turning to
the final element of the doctrine, the court determined that delaying the reso-
lution of the question of the existence of sovereign immunity until the lower
court rendered a final judgment on the merits was not possible because "the
right to be free from the burdens of trial is effectively unreviewable on ap-
peal from a final judgment. '79 The court's rationale for this conclusion was
that federal sovereign immunity protects the government from suit itself
rather than just from liability after adjudication on the merits.80 In other
words, the government would already have suffered the burdens of trial if the
D.C. Circuit waited until the rendering of a final judgment before hearing the
government's appeal.81
2. Federal Sovereign Immunity
After concluding that the "OIC's substantial claim of immunity from the
proceedings ordered by the district court suffices to entitle OIC to an inter-
locutory appeal," the D.C. Circuit proceeded to consider the OIC's claim of
sovereign immunity.82 The court recognized the current circuit split regard-
ing whether a statutory provision can expressly waive a government entity's
federal sovereign immunity status in a civil case.83 The D.C. Circuit acknowl-
edged the decisions by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits finding a statutory
waiver,84 and then went on to point out the decisions of appellate courts who
disagree with the decisions rendered by these two circuits.85
The D.C. Circuit considered the criminal nature of the contempt pro-
ceeding, and asserted that "it is far from clear that Congress has waived fed-
eral sovereign immunity in the context of criminal contempt. '86 Iterating the
need for a waiver of federal sovereign immunity to be expressly stated in the
statutory language, the court concluded that it "kn[e]w of no statutory provi-
sion expressly waiving federal sovereign immunity from criminal contempt
proceedings." 87
The court indicated that it was leaning toward requiring an explicit statu-
tory waiver of sovereign immunity in civil or criminal cases, but the court
decided the case on different grounds. 88 The court proceed to the merits of
the case without determining the immunity question because "[gliven the
78 Id.
79 Id. (citing Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 800-01 (1989)).
80 Id. (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)).
81 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d at 999.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 999-1001.
84 Id. at 1000 (citing Pullman Constr. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th
Cir. 1994); Alaska v. United States, 64 F.3d 1352, 1355-57 (9th Cir. 1995)).
85 Id. at 1000 n.6 (citing McQueen v. Bullock, 907 F.2d 1544 (5th Cir. 1990); Coleman v.
Espy, 986 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1993)).
86 Id. at 999.
87 Id. at 1000.
88 Id.
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'quasi-jurisdictional or 'hybrid' status' . . . of federal sovereign immunity,"
courts are only obligated to deal with pure jurisdictional matters before pro-
ceeding to the merits.89 In other words, the court asserted that it could de-
cide the merits of the case before addressing quasi-jurisdictional issues first.90
3. The Scope of Rule 6(e)
Relying on the court's decision in Barry, the D.C. Circuit stated that a
prima facie violation of Rule 6(e) exists if an article discloses information
constituting "matters occurring before the grand jury," and a government at-
torney is a source of this same information.91 The court quickly disposed
with the latter of the two requirements; the OIC conceded that a member of
its staff was the source of the information.92 This left the court to decide the
definition of "matters occurring before the grand jury" within the context of
Rule 6(e).93
The D.C. Circuit recognized the District Court's reliance on D.C. Circuit
precedent in determining that the disclosure satisfied the rule's requirement
of "matters occurring before the grand jury."94 The D.C. Circuit was quick to
point out, however, that since the time of the Dow Jones decision, a subse-
quent opinion warned against interpreting the language of that decision too
broadly when applying Rule 6(e) to later enforcement proceedings. 95 Al-
though the court acknowledged that Rule 6(e) may be interpreted to include
matters "likely to occur before the grand jury," disclosure of this nature
would need to include a discussion of matters such as "clearly anticipated
testimony," rather than any general discussion of an investigation's
direction.
96
Relying on both the text and the underlying purpose of Rule 6(e), the
D.C. Circuit clarified the meaning of "matters occurring before the grand
jury." With respect to the text of the rule, the court focused on the need for
the information in question to be before the grand jury, rather than merely
89 Id. at 1000-01 (quoting United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., Inc., 173
F.3d 890, 893 (1999); noting that a debate exists among the courts over whether to characterize
the question of the existence of federal sovereign immunity is a purely jurisdictional
characterization).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1001 (citing Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. The District Court relied on the language of the Dow Jones decision, where the
court noted that matters occurring before the grand jury "encompass[ ] 'not only what has oc-
curred and what is occurring, but also what is likely to occur,' including 'the identities of wit-
nesses or jurors, the substance of testimony as well as actual transcripts, the strategy or direction
of the investigation, the deliberations or questions of jurors, and the like."' Id. (quoting In re
Motion of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
95 Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1071 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). In re
Sealed Case 98-3077 involved a previous contempt proceeding against Independent Counsel
Starr based on allegations he improperly disclosed other matters involving the grand jury investi-
gation of President Clinton.
96 Id. at 1002-03.
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"'coincidentally before"' the grand jury.97 Next, the D.C. Circuit opined that
the purpose of Rule 6(e) also limited the rule's scope, because the rule served
to "preserve the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings themselves." 98 The
court found this significant when concluding that an assessment of any al-
leged violation of Rule 6(e) requires a court to distinguish between state-
ments that concern the grand jury investigation and those that relate to an
investigation by the prosecutor's office.99 Information meeting the former
category is "core Rule 6(e) material that is afforded the broadest protection
from disclosure[s],"'1 while information falling within the latter category
would only raise Rule 6(e) concerns when the statements "directly reveal
grand jury matters."''1 1
4. The Application of Rule 6(e) to the New York Tunes Article
In connection with the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the scope and
meaning of Rule 6(e), the court looked to the particular facts of this case in
order to determine "whether the alleged disclosures in the New York Times
article relied upon by the district court in ordering a criminal contempt pro-
ceeding constitute a prima facie violation of Rule 6(e)."'102 The court an-
swered this question in the negative, reasoning that the alleged disclosures 0 3
did not satisfy the definition of "matters occurring before the grand jury."'1 4
The D.C. Circuit explained that information which asserts that an indictment
should be sought, rather than "has been sought or will be sought," was not
definite enough to meet this portion of the Rule's definition. 05 Additionally,
the alleged disclosures cannot be interpreted to fall within the concept of
matters "likely to occur" because the information did not speak to a specific
time period in the future during which an indictment would be sought.
106
Finally, the D.C. Circuit characterized the disclosed information as represent-
ing the mere desire of government attorneys to seek an indictment, rather
than a concrete decision on the part of the prosecutor's office to actually seek
one.'1 7
97 Id. at 1001-02 (quoting Senate of Puerto Rico v. United States, 823 F.2d 574, 582 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
98 Id. at 1002.
99 Id. (noting that other courts, including the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, have focused on such a distinction in related decisions).
100 1l (explaining that such disclosures would be of matters "actually presented to the
grand jury").
101 Id. The court went on to note, however, that even when statements do not fall within
the scope of Rule 6(e), many times "disclosures by the prosecution referencing its own investiga-
tion[s] should not be made for tactical reasons, or are in fact prohibited by other Rules or ethical
guidelines." Id. at 1003.
'02 L at 999.
103 The disclosures in question were essentially that members of the OIC staff believed an
indictment of President Clinton should be brought even while he remained a sitting president.
IM at 997.
104 Id. at 1003-04.
'05 Id at 1003.
106 Id. at 1004.
107 Id.
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The D.C. Circuit further noted that general public knowledge of matters,
which normally constitute Rule 6(e) protected material, may impact the deci-
sion as to whether an alleged Rule 6(e) violation actually occurred. 10 8 The
court acknowledged that the information contained in the New York Times
article, discussing the possible indictment of President Clinton due to his tes-
timony before the grand jury, would normally be considered material pro-
tected by Rule 6(e) because it identified both a subject of, and witness
before, a grand jury.109 However, in light of the public's knowledge that
President Clinton was both a grand jury witness and the subject of a grand
jury investigation, the D.C. Circuit was not willing to conclude that the "OIC
'disclosed' the name of a grand jury witness," thus finding no violation of
Rule 6(e).110
The D.C. Circuit, therefore, reversed the District Court and concluded
that the OIC did not violate Rule 6(e). 111 The court ordered summary rever-
sal of the orders of the District Court, and remanded the case to the lower
court with instructions to dismiss the criminal contempt proceeding.
112
E. Analysis
In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091 does not represent a major change or
modification in the application of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) to
alleged disclosures of material covered by the grand jury secrecy require-
ment. The decision does, however, serve to clarify prior precedent relating to
the scope of the Rule's coverage. 113 Although this decision did not assert
that confusion existed as to what disclosures constitute grand jury matters, it
did recognize the difference in interpretation as to what constitutes informa-
tion "likely to occur" before the grand jury.114 The D.C. Circuit seems to
require a significant level of specificity and definiteness before it will find a
Rule 6(e) violation for the disclosure of information regarding the future of a
grand jury investigation; more than the lower court believed current prece-
dent required. 115 The concept of specificity calls for the information to con-
tain more than the mere strategic desires of the prosecutor's office. Instead,
it requires disclosures of decisions to take action in the future where the sub-
108 Id. The court cited In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1994), for the proposition
that "[w]here the general public is already aware of the information contained in the prosecu-
tor's statement, there is no additional harm in the prosecutor referring to such information." In
re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
109 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d at 1004.
110 Id. The court cautioned that "a prosecutor is not free to leak grand jury material and
then make a self serving claim that the matter is no longer secret." Id. at 1004 n.13 (citing In re
North, 16 F.3d at 1245).
11 Id. at 1004-05.
112 Id. Because the court ruled in this manner, the alternative relief requested by the OIC,
a stay pending appeal, was dismissed as moot. Id.
113 In particular, the decision clarifies, and even possibly narrows, the language used in In
re Motion of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1998), especially with respect to the scope
of what constitutes matters "likely to occur" before the grand jury. In re Sealed Case No. 99-
3091, 192 F.3d at 1001-02.
114 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d at 1001-02.
115 See supra section D.4.
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ject of such action relates to the grand jury investigation itself.116 Further,
the concept of definiteness calls for a time frame within which this antici-
pated action is to occur, rather than a mere suggestion that a particular
course of action will happen at some indefinite point in the future." 7 Parties
interested in this decision will want to keep such requirements in mind when
making or assessing public disclosures of possible grand jury information.
Because this decision serves to clarify rather than to modify the scope of
Rule 6(e), it is not likely to have a significant impact on future show cause
and criminal contempt proceedings. It is possible, however, that because the
court clarified what constitutes a prima facie case, fewer meritless claims of
Rule 6(e) violations may be alleged in the future, and fewer subsequent ap-
peals may be filed. The rationale for this assertion is that potential parties
would have an opportunity to assess the available evidence in a given situa-
tion at the outset, and thus would be better informed about whether the re-
quired evidence exists for a finding of a prima facie violation, and for the
affirmation of such a determination on appeal.
Although the D.C. Circuit did clarify many matters relating to the merits
of this appeal, the decision does leave open a variety of questions relating not
only to Rule 6(e), but also to the jurisdictional matters surrounding federal
sovereign immunity. With respect to Rule 6(e), because the court failed to
find a prima facie violation by the OIC,"8 the court did not answer the ques-
tion of whether an entity, such as the OIC, may be subject to Rule 6(e). A
ruling that Rule 6(e) applies only to individuals and not to entities could
result in a giant loophole that swallows the purposes of the rule. If an entity
could avoid liability for violating the grand jury secrecy rule, there would be
little incentive for an entity's directors to outline practices and procedures
that would ensure that its staff members adhere to the rule's requirements.
Yet if an entity, along with an individual, could be penalized for violating this
rule, then such practices are more likely to be established, and the secrecy of
the grand jury will be better protected.
With respect to federal sovereign immunity, the D.C. Circuit appears to
be at odds with those courts who characterize questions relating to the sub-
ject as solely jurisdictional rather than hybrid in nature." 9 By framing the
question as a hybrid one, the court was able to avoid answering the question
of whether a statutory waiver of federal sovereign immunity exists with re-
spect to particular civil or criminal actions. It may be argued that such an
action had little overall effect in this particular case because the court did not
find that the OIC violated Rule 6(e). The court's approach, however, did in
fact require the OIC to defend itself against the claims made by the President
and the White House because it proceeded to assess the merits of the case. If
the OIC were indeed entitled to claim immunity from this suit, then it was
unnecessarily burdened by the D.C. Circuit's requirement that both parties
brief and argue the merits of this claim of a Rule 6(e) violation. It may be
116 Id.
117 L
118 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d at 1005.
119 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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argued, however, that such burdens are both justified and reasonable in light
of the importance of maintaining the integrity and secrecy of the grand jury
system.
Finally, concerns remain over the effectiveness of Rule 6(e) if sovereign
immunity precludes an individual, harmed by a violation of Rule 6(e) from
seeking redress against government attorneys and responsible entities. In ad-
dition, the integrity and secrecy of the grand jury system may well be jeop-
ardized if the government can not be compelled to adhere to the system's
purposes and procedures.
In light of the continued disagreement among the circuit courts with re-
gard to the characterization and existence of a claim of federal sovereign
immunity, and the questions begged by this court's ambiguous commentary
on the subject, a clarifying and unifying decision may be necessary. The
United States Supreme Court should, therefore, consider granting certiorari
to a case that would allow the Justices to weigh these issues and provide a
more conclusive response.
F. Conclusion
Overall, one principle sounding clearly throughout this opinion and
throughout the authority cited therein, is the importance of maintaining the
integrity and secrecy of the grand jury system. The purposes and functions of
the proceedings are best served by the continued viability of a grand jury
secrecy rule, such as the one codified in Rule 6(e). It remains clear to all
interested parties that the D.C. Circuit will not tolerate an abuse of this rule
or an abuse of the grand jury system itself. Therefore, this decision serves
not only to maintain and to clarify the application of Rule 6(e) within the
circuit, but also to remind government attorneys of their responsibilities to
their employer, and to all individuals involved in a grand jury investigation.
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